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The Evolution of American Culture:
The Problematic Place of Race and the
Right to Have Rights
Gerald Torres*
This essay is a reflection on the scholarly work of Judge A.
Leon Higginbotham. His writings on American slavery are not
only factually detailed, but are driven by the conundrum of our co-
lonial period: the most inhuman of institutions was justified and
protected simultaneously with the greatest expansion in human
rights that the world had seen up to that time.' The historical
ubiquity of slavery appears paradoxical, especially if it occurs in
those cultures during those times when the self-consciously ani-
mating principles of those cultures seem antithetical to that cruel
institution.2
Thus, the timing of the writing of this essay is propitious. I
write in the middle of a Black History Month that is punctuated
by a war that has heightened nativist sentiments,3 by the national
coverage of the expulsion of a student from a major university for
drunkenly shouting racist and anti-semitic epithets, 4 and by the
Minnesota Supreme Court upholding an anti-bias ordinance
designed to curb racist behavior.5 The issue of race and its mean-
ing for our culture remain resolutely unresolved.6 The best of our
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Yale University, 1977; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1980. The author is currently
working on a series of articles that integrate recent developments in translation
and cultural theory into an analysis of law and legal action. This work is an exten-
sion of his efforts in critical race theory.
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1. Orlando Patterson, in his great comparative work on slavery makes a simi-
lar point. See generally Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (1982).
2. See generally id.
3. This essay was written in February, 1991, during the Persian Gulf Crisis.
4. Brown University expelled Douglas Hann for shouting racial epithets in vio-
lation of a University anti-harrassment rule. Student at Brown Is Expelled Under a
Rule Barring "Hate Speech", N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1991, at A17, col. 1 (late ed.)
5. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. 1991), cert granted,
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 59 U.S.L.W. 3823 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L. J. 758 (challenging
the entire structure of the integrationist ideal). In the context of popular culture,
Spike Lee's motion picture Do the Right Thing was sufficiently ambiguous and
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sentiments to the contrary, race continually emerges as a category
for regulating our social life.
The work of A. Leon Higginbotham explores why race,
rather than class for example, has been, and continues to be, the
central divide in our history. As a historian he has a perspective
informed by deep involvement with the legal process. He is care-
ful, however, not to let the law and its manifold justifications ob-
scure the historical record nor to hide the cultural institutions
supporting the rules. The law may provide the structure, but the
culture supplies the design.
In reviewing the work of Judge Higginbotham one is struck
by the intensity of his focus: race is the lens through which he
views the evolution of the law.7 Higginbotham demonstrates how
the law participated in the process of social legitimation of slav-
ery.8 He is sensitive to the nineteenth century theoretical sub-
strate underlying many of the racial attitudes he chronicles and
which spawned the racially loaded legal institutions that he criti-
cizes. The firmly held-and for its period, respectable-belief in
the polygenesis of humanity allowed racialist attitudes to flourish
free from moral taint.9 The science justified the social relations. 10
It remains unclear whether the "science" supporting those
views degraded before the patent immorality of human slavery
was inescapably evident. The science, of course, was expressed as
the explanation and description of the natural order of things.
What is meet and just must similarly comport with the "natural
order of things." To move away from the patterns of nature is to
invite chaos and immorality. To restructure society contrary to
the rules of nature and motivated by purely human norms was to
arrogate to humanity a role reserved for a higher power. This con-
troubling to inspire a widespread public debate over the meaning of the movie and
the "despair" that it depicted. What was amusing about much of the commentary
was its focus on the despair contained in the loss of hope of the capacity of our cul-
ture to resolve racial conflict rather than the despair reflected in the stunted lives
actually lived in the mythical Bed-Sty neighborhood. This was compounded by
Lee's decision to people the movie with symbols rather than characters.
7. Judge Higginbotham is careful to note that race is not the only issue of im-
portance, nor is it necessarily the most profound source of the problems facing our
society. He does note, however, that the problems arising from race and racist uses
of the law are still with us. They are just as malignant, if not as potent, as they
used to be. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Se2; Education and Missouri Ju-
risprudence: Shelley v. Kraemer in a Historical Perspective, 67 Wash. U.L.Q. 673
(1989).
8. See generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color.
9. See generally Miles, Racism 42-49, 73-77 (1989).
10. See generally Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 158-84
(1966)(discussing the rise of "race-thinking" in Western Countries during the nine-
teenth century).
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stellation of beliefs, whether held implicitly or explicitly, was re-
flected in the law.
Judge Higginbotham observes that the treatment of African-
Americans, aboriginal peoples, and women has not traced an un-
broken line to a higher ground. Instead, it has revealed the slow
progress towards a re-understanding of the natural order of things.
For Judge Higginbotham, the history of African-Americans in Mis-
souri jurisprudence reflects the moral evolution of American law.
He is careful to note, however, that our moral development did not
occur in a vacuum, but was part of the evolving enlightened senti-
ment in the international discourse on human rights. When as-
sessing the law of Missouri prior to the landmark case of Shelley v.
Kraemer," Judge Higginbotham notes that Shelley is in a line of
cases stretching back to Dred Scott v. Sanford.12
Dred Scott stated the premise that had to be challenged con-
tinually: blacks had "no rights which the white man was bound to
respect."1 3 As a rhetorical device, the severity of that formulation
leaves the reader incredulous. Anticipating such a reaction, Judge
Higginbotham constructs a historical test. The test is in the nature
of a criminal prosecution of a slave named "Celia."' 4
In State v. Celia,'5 a slave was accused of first degree murder
for killing her owner when he ventured to her cabin to have sex
with her, as was his habit, after being warned by her that if he did
so on that night she would hurt him. The lawyer for Celia asked
that the Missouri statute excusing homicide when committed by a
women in the act of resisting rape be applied to Celia.' 6 The lan-
guage of the operative statutes was phrased in terms of "any wo-
man."' 7 The questions faced by the judge in deciding how to
instruct the jury were whether Celia was resisting "rape" and
whether she was a "woman" for purposes of the mitigating
statute.18
The judge chose to instruct the jury that if Celia struck the
11. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 679-80.
13. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). That phrase gained
wider currency in our culture as expressed by Eldridge Cleaver in his book, Soul on
Ice (1967). While the statement was never completely true as a legal matter when
uttered either by Justice Taney or by Mr. Cleaver, they might be understood to be
making a descriptive, phenomenological statement that could be true in either
epoch.
14. See Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 680-85.
15. State of Missouri v. Celia, Vol. 2 Index to Court Cases of Callaway County,
File No. 4,496 at 13 (1855), cited in Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 680.
16. Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 687.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 682-83.
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blow that killed her master, even if she did it fighting off his at-
tempt to force her into sexual intercourse, she should be found
guilty of first degree murder.19 Analyzing the Judge's reason for
choosing that instruction could take any number of paths. First,
he could have decided that the rape defense could not stand be-
cause no rape was possible. As the testimony revealed, Celia's
master was in the habit of forcing her to have sex.20 They had sex
often. This "habit" of her master rested on implicit consent. Con-
sent vitiates the charge of rape.2 1 Thus, no substantial claim could
be made that the blow was made in defense of her person.
Yet, to assert that defense, even if it was ineffective, is to con-
cede that Celia had a claim that she had surrendered. To say that
her consent had been waived is to imply that she had the legal
power to resist. Such a concession would yield to the slave some
power to define the social relations between her and her owner.
Even the construction of that hypothesis reveals its weakness:
slave/master, owner/owned. 22 Admittedly, the Missouri Constitu-
tion of 1820 directed the legislature to "oblige the owners of slaves
to treat them with humanity, and to abstain from all injuries to
them extending to life or limb."23 Yet the obligation was to treat
the slaves humanely, not to recognize their humanity.
Judge Higginbotham supposes that there was another reason
for the judge to reject the instruction proffered by the defense.
The reason is that the mitigating statute did not apply.24 For the
statute to be used by Celia, the state would have to recognize her
as a member of class that the statute was designed to protect. The
statute was aimed at protecting women. The operative question
then was whether Celia was a woman? The answer seems to sug-
19. Id. at 683.
20. Id. at 681.
21. See, for example, Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1255 (1986), for a discussion on
the debate surrounding the marital rape exception.
22. I should make it clear that the owner/owned dichotomy as a conceit must
not be taken too far. Ownership is a legal conclusion. Ownership is merely short-
hand for a particular set of relations with regard to a particular thing or class of
things. The descriptive and normative tasks of spelling out the relationships that
comprise ownership within any particular property system is the objective of the
legal system. The legal system does not, however, describe all of the possible ob-
ject-relations in any society or culture. There is evidence that the legal institutions
of the antebellum South recognized, within limits, the humanity, that is the non-
object character of slaves, even as those same institutions protected the preroga-
tives of the slave owners. Higginbotham makes just the same point. See infra text
accompanying notes 27 - 32.
23. Mo. Const. of 1820, art. III, § 26, quoted in Higginbotham, supra note 7, at
689 n.73.
24. See Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 683.
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gest itself. Yet to have conceded womanhood to Celia would have
been to concede gender to slaves.
Gender is a social, not a biological category.25 Joseph Singer,
in a review of Elizabeth Spelman's book, Inessential Woman:
Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought, sums up this distinc-
tion and its lineage: "[Aristotle's] differentiation between men, wo-
men, and slaves makes clear that one's gender is inseparable from
one's 'racial' identity: only certain males and females count as
'men' and 'women.' "26 Thus the judge need not calculate the de-
gree of consent or the nature of the property interest held by the
slave owner. Abstractly stated, the answer is one that makes sense
to modem legal ears: Celia could not take refuge behind the stat-
ute because it was not meant to protect her.
To claim that the slave was the mere property of the slave
owner and thus not entitled to protection is to oversimplify a com-
plex and deeply textured social and legal relationship. American
slavery may have yielded Celia, but while she was incapable of de-
manding full human recognition, she was more than a piece of
chattel. The slaves' humanity made them a special form of prop-
erty, but their humanity was secondary. As Judge Higginbotham
notes: "The recognition of the human nature of a person did not
inevitably entail ... the granting of personal rights. ' '27
The personal rights they were denied included all of those
that would have granted them an existence apart from their
master. So, despite the limitations of the property characteriza-
tion, the slaves' legal existence was defined totally in opposition to
freemen, especially their masters. A slave's incapacity to sue was
suspended only when he or she was making the claim that he or
she was not really a slave at all, but a free person wrongfully held
in slavery.28 Thus the power to sue, while present in a slave, was
present in the slave only when the slave occupied the social cate-
gory denying the incapacity. Liberty was not something a slave
could legally demand even when he had purchased his freedom if
his owner denied the existence of the agreement.2 9 Manumission
was the province of the master.
Recognizing the humanity of the slave while simultaneously
25. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (1987).
26. Joseph William Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?, 1989 Duke
L. J. 1752, 1778 (quoting Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Ex-
clusion in Feminist Thought 54 (1988)).
27. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Property FirsA Human-
ity Second. The Recognition of the Slave's Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law,
50 Ohio St. L.J. 511, 525 (1989).
28. Id. at 533-34.
29. Id. at 526-28.
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denying agency to that humanity was central to the maintenance
of the slave's object status. The law, however, was not completely
coherent. Recognizing the human capacities of slaves at times en-
hanced their object value and at other times shielded their owners
from liability.30 Early law also allowed slaves the choice of free-
dom or slavery when such choice was the gift of the master at
death. Over the course of a few decades, however, courts that gave
the slaves that choice came to abandon their judgment. 31 Perhaps
it was the press of events leading up to the Civil War that led
courts to reconsider their view toward fulfilling the testator's in-
tent. In any event, the logic of the case law was at war with itself.
Since the humanity of the slaves was distinctly limited by law and
public policy, granting the choice for freedom or continued slavery
meant not just respecting the intent of the dead slave owner, but
granting, even momentarily, the condition of freedom to the
slave-a quality their condition could not admit. Like the Union,
they could not be both slave and free.
When analyzing the slave codes and the evolution of the legal
treatment of slaves, bearing in mind the singular condition of slav-
ery and its opposite, one must not forget the scientific doctrines
that underlay the moral arguments for the continued enslavement
of an entire race. The notion of polygenesis is critical, because as
one could not be both slave and free (the conditions of humanity
hinged on the classification) neither could one be both white and
black.32 The vexatious problem of race is at the heart of this ten-
sion. Without the fig leaf of racialist theory, the brutality of
human slavery would have had to have been confronted directly.
There would have been no sanction from heaven. The law would
not have reflected the natural order of things, but would have
stood revealed as the human creation that it is: not an imperfect
reflection of the higher law, but an accurate representation of the
basest of human designs.
The embarrassment of imperfection revealed itself in the
slave statutes themselves. Slavery was a condition originally de-
fined under Virginia statutes independent of race.33 Slavery was a
30. See generally id.
31. Id. at 537-38.
32. This is a familiar theme in the law of American race relations. See, for ex-
ample, the treatment of Indians, whites and blacks in the legal categories that ap-
ply to those groups. See, e.g., Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating
Yonnondio By Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 Duke L.J.
625, 650-52.
33. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Inter-
racial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 Georgetown L.J.
1967, 1970 (1989).
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condition that could be inherited whether one were legally white
or black depending upon the status of one's mother.34
Similarly, in resolving the question of whether Indians could
legally be enslaved, the method of importation was central: if they
were brought into Virginia overland they could not be enslaved,
but if they were imported by ship they could be.35 This statute
was also, technically, race neutral.38 This is not to say that race
was a legally irrelevant category, instead it merely suggests that
the legislature was circumspect about writing statutes in a purely
racial way. Other characteristics were sufficient proxies for race.37
Indians, after all, were later to be included within the class of peo-
ple who could be enslaved.3 8
Such a system could be workable where the races were kept
separate and pure. But, as State v. Celia demonstrated, the races
though kept separate did intermingle and produce confusion. What
was the child of an African and a European? What about an In-
dian and European or an African and Indian? Could such children
be enslaved? Since Indians could be enslaved and the condition of
slavery could be inherited through the condition of the mother,
would the child of an Indian and African be enslaved if the Indian
mother were free? Could they be born into freedom and then en-
slaved? Would they have access to the courts to demand their
freedom? Could the child of such unions ever regain their status
as white? Could their status be changed retroactively? What
rights hinged on the classifications?
The legislature sought the path out of this confusion by con-
sciously creating categories of rights that were race dependent.3 9
The irony of the legislative solution was the that by the time the
legislature saw fit to create inflexible categories of rights based
upon race, the idea of racial purity was already so far removed
from the existing material reality as to make the categories appear
delusional.40
The ideology of race, however, could not be based upon the
real conditions of "purity" since that condition never existed. In-
stead, the ideology emerged in law as an attempt to cabin and de-
fine certain social practices that were found to be destabilizing.
34. Id. at 1973.
35. Id. at 1973-74.
36. Id. at 1974.
37. Id. at 1974-75 (Religion, for example, was often used as a substitute for
race.).
38. Id.




That the social practices and the laws describing them were con-
tradictory merely made the laws unstable, but did not undermine
the power relations that legitimized them. The laws controlling
"negroes" and specifically defining blacks, Indians, and mulattoes
created the separate institutional supports that buttressed the in-
stitution of slavery.
Free blacks would be controlled by the race statutes or be en-
couraged to leave. Inter-racial sexual relations would be prohib-
ited. Inter-racial marriages would be initially recognized, but
would subject the parties to banishment. Those unions would later
be declared void ab initio. The children of such unions-whether
legitimate or not-would devolve to the lower racial category. The
subjugation could occur on an individual as well as class-wide ba-
sis. The condition of white superiority was reproducible not only
through slavery, but by limiting the possibilities of inter-racial
community that would be based on some foundation other than
white supremacy. As the population became even more racially
mixed, the laws against "race-mixing" became harsher and who
was or was not white became stricter.4i
As the definition of whiteness moved towards the "not one
drop" of negro blood standard it moved away from the reality of
racial mixing in antebellum Virginia and more firmly into the em-
brace of scientific racialism. Judge Higginbotham comments on
the use of "expert" witnesses in trials to determine the racial ori-
gin of persons.42 The experts based their judgments on the notion
of ideal racial types and thus supported the view that a married
woman who gave birth to a mulatto child (that is one whose ap-
pearance raised doubt about its lineage) would presumptively be
assumed to have committed adultery. "Among the hundreds of
millions of whites in Europe, there is no authenticated instance of
the produce of the white race being other than white."43
Why did the legislature move to narrow the classification of
"whiteness"? What was the fear that motivated the change from
proportional evaluation to the evaluation based upon presumed ra-
cial types? One answer suggested by Judge Higginbotham is that
clearly established racial definitions were essential for the mainte-
41. See generally id. As Higginbotham points out, the laws against miscegena-
tion were written to preserve racial purity, but even they recognized the so-called
Pocahontas exception. The mixing of "races" was a noble part of the mythology of
State of Virginia.
42. Id. 1997-2000.
43. Id. at 2000 (quoting the President of the Court in the case of Watkins and
wife v. Carlton 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 560 (1840)) Watkins was a challenge to one child's
share of the estate of Carlton. The claim was that the child claiming the share was
a mulatto and thus could not be the child of the decedent, a white man.
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nance of white male control. Judge Higginbotham examined the
law of inter-racial sexual relations to test his hypothesis and found
that the concern with involuntary inter-racial sex was premised al-
most entirely on the need to maintain white male domination over
blacks in general (free or slave) and white women as well."
Thus the cases of rape rarely involved white women of low
social status.45 In fact, in one case, even though the jury felt com-
pelled to convict the black man accused of attempted rape, they
also felt called upon to ask the Governor for mercy. In its recom-
mendation for mercy the jury foreman noted:
3d.... There is no doubt that he repaired to the house of Mrs.
Stevens in the belief that she would cheerfully submit to his
embraces, as she doubtless had done before, but finding her
absent he probably supposed his embraces would be equally
agreeable to his daughter [Mary Jane], and in making the at-
tempt the jury considered the offence as differing only in
name from a similar attempt made upon one of his own color.
They also considered that the law was made to preserve the
distinction which should exist between our two kinds of popu-
lation, and to protect the whites in the possession of their su-
periority; but here the whites had yielded their claims to the
protection of the law by their voluntary associations with those
whom the law distinguishes as their inferiors.46
The reason for the restriction on inter-racial sexual relations is re-
vealed here not as a social control designed to preserve the purity
of racial types, but one designed to preserve the differences that
those racial types represented.
The symbolism of different racial types was critical to the
maintenance of social control. For a white person to debase him-
self or herself was to forget the reasons for the difference. The dif-
ference was natural. The law merely enforced public morality-
and social control of the powerful-by enacting codes that made
cognizable physical distinctions the basis of legal status and by be-
ing harsh about where the line fell. As the case above indicates,
the law could judge whites or blacks harshly when they ignored
the lines of color that the law made significant, although blacks
were almost always dealt with more severely.47
By retaining the fiction of racial purity the law could ignore
the reality of the continuum of "racial types" and could make
color the objective test of a created status. Color could also be a
handy substitute for legitimate social status. The law could thus
44. See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 33, at 2008.
45. See id. at 2012-13.
46. Id. at 2013.
47. See id. at 2008-20.
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concern itself with protecting the distinction between higher and
lower elements. The more white people resembled black people,
the less the law had to be concerned with them.
More critical than the law's treatment, however, was the in-
ternalization of the norm of racially coded hierarchy that is cap-
tured by the jury foreman's remarks. The justification contained
in the plea for mercy for the convicted black man was premised
upon the natural foundation for the law under which the man was
condemned. Where the natural order had been breached by the
white person no punishment should come to the black person who
treated that white person just like another black.48 What else
could Mrs. Stevens have expected? The domination her daughter
experienced was authorized, even if done through a convoluted
and incoherent notion of consent.
The authority of slave masters in the antebellum South was
maintained by the transformation of "force into right, and obedi-
ence into duty."49 The conditions of subjugation, domination and
subordination, was not maintained through brutality alone. If that
were true no rural slave master would have been safe. Instead, as
Higginbotham's work demonstrates, the slave codes reflected pre-
exiting property relations within which the institutions of slavery
were made to fit. By appropriating the language of freedom that
was at the heart of the property system, the maintenance of slav-
ery became the maintenance of freedom. The existence of free
blacks destabilized the system of property relations within which
slavery functioned and they necessitated the creation of new codes
to accommodate their existence. Thus, the codes shifted from just
regulating the relations between white people and black people
through the medium of the slave law to overtly regulating behav-
ior on the basis of race.
That transformation is the critical link between the slave
codes and the contemporary law of race relations. The existence
of codes that legitimized object relations between human beings is
the least important artifact of that period in this regard. Tradition,
upon which the authority of the law depends, is firmly rooted in
the social practice of creating legal categories based upon race, but
these categories were created expressly to maintain the
subordinated position of the dominated racial category and those
like them.
48. This forgets, of course, that the plea for mercy thoroughly debases the sta-
tus of black women and removes certain classes of white women from the protec-
tion of white men.
49. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality (Maurice Cranston
trans. 1984).
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The common lineage between the pre-Civil War race codes
and the Jim Crow laws of the Reconstruction and post-reconstruc-
tion period is found in the insecurity of the ruling elite. Perhaps
the dissatisfaction with current affirmative action policy might be
found in the same insecurity; perhaps we might find it rooted in
the same impulse that created the race codes in the first place.
Perhaps the insecurity in founded in the fear that challenging the
continuing socially subordinated position of black people might
also lead to a challenge to the socially subordinated condition of
"those like them" as well.

